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QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
THE MISSING VOICE HERRING V. KEENAN: THE
NARROWING OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
In Herring v. Keenan,' the Tenth Circuit granted a probation officer
qualified immunity after the officer divulged a probationer's HIV posi-
tive status to both his employer and to his family.2 The court held that
although a probationer enjoys certain constitutional rights, including a
constitutional right to privacy, a probationer's right to privacy regarding
his HIV status was not a "clearly established" constitutional right at the
time of the disclosure.3
Throughout the 1990's, the Tenth Circuit's definition of "clearly
established" rights has been controversial. In Eastwood v. Department of
Corrections of the State of Oklahoma,4 the Tenth Circuit admitted that its
"definitions of what constitutes a clearly established right have been
hazy." 5 Specifically, in 1992, the Tenth Circuit drastically changed the
nature of its qualified immunity requirements in Medina v. City &
County of Denver.6 With suspect justification, the Medina court drasti-
cally narrowed the definition of what constitutes a "clearly established"
right by limiting the range of sources from which a "reasonable official"
would be expected to be acquainted with for the purpose of knowing
whether a certain right exists. According to Medina, for a right to be
"clearly established" such that a "reasonable official" would be expected
to know of its existence, there must be a United States "Supreme Court
decision or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established
weight of authority from other courts.",
7
From this very narrow conception of what defines a "clearly estab-
lished" right, the Tenth Circuit slowly broadened its scope to include the
holdings in other circuits. In 1997, the Tenth Circuit stated in Lawmaster
v. Ward 8 that a government official is not free from judgment simply
1. 218 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2000).
2. See id. at 1171-72.
3. See id. at 1173.
4. 846 F.2d 627 (10th Cir. 1988).
5. Id. at 630.
6. 960 F.2d 1493 (10th Cir. 1992).
7. Id. at 1498.
8. 125 F.3d 1341, 1350-51 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Supreme Court need not have
ruled the exact conduct at issue unlawful in order for a law to be "clearly established" and that rights
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because the Supreme Court has not ruled on a particular form of
conduct. 9
Further, in Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Systems, Inc.,"° the
Tenth Circuit qualified its Medina holding by stating that the purpose of
showing that a law is "clearly established" is to assure that an official
understands that his conduct violates a right. 1 Thus, the Anaya court
affirmed Lawmaster's broadening of the definition of "clearly estab-
lished" by redefining and expanding the scope of what a reasonable gov-
ernment official would and should know. 12 The court in Anaya held that
"the shield of qualified immunity is pierced if in light of pre-existing
law, the unlawfulness of the conduct is apparent to the officer."'
13
In a considerable regression in Herring, the Tenth Circuit took a
stricter stance on what constitutes a "clearly established" right than even
Medina.14 By granting the probation officer qualified immunity, the Her-
ring court stepped away from Lawmaster and Anaya's broadening of the
definition of what constitutes a "clearly established" right, and required
strict analogies between the government officer's conduct and conduct
previously deemed unlawful by the Supreme Court or by the Tenth Cir-
cuit.15
More importantly, the Herring court's narrow view did not account
for pertinent Supreme Court precedent that clearly established that both
prisoners' and probationers' constitutional rights cannot be violated
cannot be defined too narrowly or else qualified immunity will wrongfully become an
"insurmountable obstacle to plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their constitutional rights.").
9. Id. at 1350.
10. 195 F.3d 584 (10th Cir. 1999).
11. Id. at 594.
12. Id. at 594-95 (looking to other circuit precedent, Colorado Supreme Court precedent, and
the laws of civil forfeiture to determine whether a right was "clearly established" at the time the
official undertook the act in question).
13. Id. at 594 (quoting Lawmnaster, 125 F. 3d at 1350).
14. By holding that a right is "clearly established" when the Supreme Court, Tenth Circuit, or
the weight of authority from other courts have previously held the law to be as the plaintiff maintain,
the Herring court ignored the Anaya court's specific emphasis on the "weight of authority from other
courts" portion of the test and effectively focused only on the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit.
See Herring, 218 F.3d at 1176. Furthermore, the Herring court decided to define the right of privacy
in a probationer's HIV status very narrowly, thus requiring precise factual correspondence between
the case at bar and a case previously ruled upon in the Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit. See id. at
1179.
15. Id. at 1178 ("none of the cases discuss the question whether the right to privacy protects a
probationer who may be HIV positive from a limited disclosure by his or her probation officer to
persons whom the probation officer believed might be affected by their contact with the probationer.
The cases, therefore, did not clearly establish such a right in 1993.").
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without some justification relating to a legitimate penological or proba-
tionary objective. 16
The first section of Part I of this survey discusses the Supreme
Court's treatment of qualified immunity. The second section of Part I
analyzes the Tenth Circuit's treatment of the "clearly established" prong
of the qualified immunity determination. Part II reviews the Tenth Cir-
cuit's apparent backtrack in Herring and discusses how the Tenth Cir-
cuit's narrow treatment of qualified immunity overlooked Supreme Court
and circuit precedent that recognizes the existence of a probationer's
constitutional rights,' 7 an individual's right to privacy in his or her per-
sonal information, 18 and more specifically, an individual's right to pri-
vacy concerning his or her medical information.' 9 Part III examines the
Supreme Court cases that clearly establish the balancing test a court must
conduct to determine the constitutionality of a restriction on a proba-
tioner's constitutional rights. Part IV comments upon the Supreme Court
and circuit cases that "clearly establish" that Keenan's disclosure of Her-
ring's HIV status violated his constitutional right to privacy.20 Finally,
Part V explores the social ramifications of the Tenth Circuit's decision to
grant qualified immunity in the highly sensitive right to privacy area.
Further, Part V questions the implication of the Tenth Circuit's analysis
regarding the creation of new rights in the Tenth Circuit.
16. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that a court must determine the "rational
connection" between the infringement of a prisoner's constitutional rights and the existence of a
legitimate penological goal); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (holding that the
infringement of a probationer's rights is not "unlimited" and is justified only by a showing of the
"special needs" of the probation system).
17. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74 (holding that a probationer's retains constitutional rights, but
that these rights are limited as compared to an average citizen and that they may be infringed if
justified by the "special needs" of the probation system).
18. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977) (recognizing that an individual has a right to
privacy concerning his or her interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and an individuals
interest in independently making personal decisions).
19. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3rd Cir. 1980)
(interpreting Whalen's dual privacy rights to include an individual's right to privacy in medical
records and medical information).
20. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-99 (recognizing that an individual has a right to privacy
concerning his or her interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and an individuals interest in
independently making personal decisions); Eastwood, 846 F.2d at 631 (holding that an individual
has a right to privacy that protects him or her from forced disclosure of his or her sexual history);
Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Eastwood, 846 F.2d at 631
and reiterating that the right to privacy in one's medical information was established in 1990); Harris
v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1513-14 (11 th Cir. 1991) (recognizing the existence of a constitutional
right to privacy and the "significant privacy interest" triggered by an individual's HIV information);
Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577 (interpreting Whalen's dual privacy rights to include an individual's
right to privacy in medical records and medical information).
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I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
A. Causes of Action Against Government Officials-§ 1983 and Bivens
Qualified immunity arises in situations where a government official
violates an individual's constitutional rights. In this situation, the quali-
fied immunity doctrine was developed to strike a balance between an
individual's interest in redress and society's interest in efficient govern-
ment. Individuals injured at the hands of the government have available
two avenues of redress. For violations by state or local government offi-
cials, the injured party may seek damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983.21 If a federal official violates an individual's rights directly under
the Constitution, the injured party may seek redress under the Supreme
Court's holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
22Bureau of Narcotics. In Bivens, the Court allowed an individual to state
23a cause of action directly under the Fourth Amendment. The Bivens
Court stated that "where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.,
24
As a result, Bivens stands for the right of an individual to sue a federal
officer for a constitutional violation directly under that portion of the
constitution that is alleged to be violated.25
B. Qualified Immunity in the Supreme Court-The Harlow Objective
Reasonableness Test
Through § 1983 and Bivens, an individual is entitled to state a cause
of action for virtually any infringement at the hand of a local, state, or
federal government actor.26 Because of qualified immunity, however, the
right to state a cause of action by no means guarantees vindication for the
27
vioaltion. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court defined the justi-
21. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an
act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
22. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
23. Id. at 397 ("Having concluded that the petitioner's complaint states a cause of action
under the Fourth Amendment, we hold that petitioner is entitled to recover money damages for any
injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the Amendment.").
24. Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
25. Id. at 397.
26. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
27. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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fications for qualified immunity as a defense against government official
liability. According to Harlow, qualified immunity for government offi-
cials is necessary to strike the proper balance between the need to protect
the rights of individual citizens and the "need to protect officials who are
required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in en-
couraging the vigorous exercise of official authority. '28 According to
Harlow, the unfettered ability to sue the government carries with it
enormous social costs. 29 The Court believed that qualified immunity
would be a viable mechanism to reduce the burden on society caused by
insubstantial lawsuits.
30
Prior to Harlow, the Court refused to grant qualified immunity where
it could be shown that the official "knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility
would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiffl, or if he took the
action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights or other injury .... In Harlow, the Court decided that the
subjective portion of the Wood qualified immunity standard was "incom-
patible" with the stated goal of qualified immunity-to terminate insub-
32stantial lawsuits prior to trial. Whether a government official acted with
malicious intent is typically a question of fact to be determined at trial
after time-consuming discovery and depositions.33 As a result, the Court
chose to eliminate the subjective element from the qualified immunity
standard and stated a new standard, "that government officials perform-
ing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known. 34 The Court stated:
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as
measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid exces-
sive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many in-
substantial claims on summary judgment. On summary judgment,
the judge may appropriately determine, not only the currently appli-
cable law, but whether the law was clearly established at the time an
action occurred. If the law at that time was not clearly established, an
official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent le-
28. id. at 807.
29. Id. at 814 (discussing such social costs to include the "expenses of litigation, the diversion
of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of
public office.").
30. Id.
31. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). Prior to Harlow, there was a subjective
element involved in determining whether an official knew that his conduct violated a "clearly
established" ight. Id.
32. Harlow. 457 U.S. at 815-16.
33. Id. at 816-17.
34. Id. at 818.
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gal developments, nor could be fairly be said to 'know' that the law
forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful.
35
C. Defining Harlow's Objective Reasonableness-Anderson v. Creigh-
ton
In Anderson v. Creighton,36 the Supreme Court shed light upon the
question of what a reasonable official is to be expected to know. A gov-
ernment official's ability to invoke qualified immunity turns on whether
that official's conduct was objectively reasonable "in light of the legal
rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it was taken. 37 The Court
stated that in order for the goals of qualified immunity to be met, the
"clearly established" rule must be defined "in a ... particularized, and
hence more relevant, sense ...... 38 The Court stated that if the legal rule
was defined generally, "[p]laintiffs would be able to convert the rule of
qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually
unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract
",39rights. Most importantly, the Anderson Court seemed to address an
issue that the Harlow Court left silent-how the circumstances under
which the current state of the law are to be determined. 40 Instead of de-
lineating a static list of courts upon whose decisions a reasonable gov-
ernment official should be knowledgeable, the Anderson Court held:
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This
is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity
unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but
it is to say that in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be ap-
parent.41
By the Anderson court holding that the very act in question need not
be deemed previously unlawful broadens the potential sources of legal
rights that a reasonable official must be aware. The Court simply re-
quired that the right be "apparent" from "pre-existing law," without an
further definition of the sources from which a law becomes "apparent.
The Anderson Court left only the negative assumption that even conduct
not previously deemed unlawful can be "clearly established" if "pre-
35. Id.
36. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
37. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
38. Id. at 640.
39. Id. at 639.
40. Id. at 640.




existing law" makes it sufficiently "apparent" that the conduct is unlaw-
ful.
43
D. Qualified Immunity in the Tenth Circuit
In order to show that a government official does not deserve quali-
fied immunity, the plaintiff must prove that (1) a constitutional right ex-
ists and was in fact violated, and (2) that the defendant's conduct vio-
lated a right that was "clearly established such that a reasonable person in
the defendant's position would have known the conduct violated the
right." 44 Unlike Anderson, the Tenth Circuit in Medina and again in Her-
ring severely limited the available sources of legal rights that a reason-
able official is expected to know.45 According to Medina and Herring, to
prove that a right was clearly established at the time of the alleged viola-
tion, "there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point,
or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have
found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.' 46
Between Medina and Herring, the Tenth Circuit modified its ap-
proach to be more in line with Anderson.47 In Lawmaster, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held, "[q]ualified immunity does not protect official conduct simply
because the Supreme Court has never held the exact conduct at issue
unlawful.' 48 Rather, the shield of qualified immunity is pierced if in light
of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness of the conduct is apparent to the
officer.' 49 Citing Franz v. Lytle,5° the Anaya court held that, "[i]n light of
this rationale underlying the qualified immunity doctrine, this court has
held, for example, that police did not enjoy qualified immunity where
there was not a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case directly on point,
43. Id.
44. Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys., Inc., 195 F.3d 584, 594 (10th Cir. 1999).
45. In Medina, the court held that in order for a fight to be clearly established, "there must be
a Supreme Court of Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority
from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains." Medina v. City &
County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992). Between 1992-2000, the Tenth Circuit
broadened the scope of their inquiry to recognize the existence of rights in the absence of a Supreme
Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point. See Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1350 (10th Cir.
1997). In Herring, the Tenth Circuit reverted back to Medina in their application of qualified
immunity by not recognizing the existence of a fight because neither the Supreme Court nor the
Tenth Circuit had previously ruled on the specific matter that was the subject of the case. See
Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2000).
46. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498; see also Herring, 195 F.3d at 1176 (holding that in order to
show that a fight is "clearly established," there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case on
point).
47. See e.g., Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 1351 (holding that rights need to be defined with a
degree of generality to facilitate a plaintiff's attempt to show that the fight was "clearly
established"); Anaya, 195 F.3d at 594-95 (expanding the range of sources of the "clearly
established" inquiry beyond just the Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit).
48. Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 1350.
49. Id.
50. 997 F.2d 784, 787-91 (10th Cir. 1993).
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and where, in fact, there was some contrary authority... from other cir-
cuits.'51 (emphasis added)
Likewise, in Franz, the Tenth Circuit denied a police officer's claim
of qualified immunity based on a search alleged to be in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 52 Despite the fact that no Supreme Court or Tenth
Circuit cases existed on point, the court denied qualified immunity
"based on the longstanding Fourth Amendment probable cause require-
ments and the officer's presumed familiarity therewith."53
When a government official seeks qualified immunity for an alleged
violation of an individual's constitutional rights,54 a court is typically
charged with the duty to employ a balancing test to weigh a government
official's need for freedom of action and an individual's constitutionally
protected rights; this is especially true when dealing with the rights of
prisoners and probationers. 55 The Tenth Circuit has previously ruled on
the determination of a "clearly established" right when a constitutional
balancing test is required. 56 On one hand, Medina stated that when a con-
stitutional deprivation must be determined by a balancing test, a court is
less likely to find the law clearly established.57 Since Medina, however,
the Tenth Circuit has uniformly held that qualified immunity can be
pierced if the officer should have known that the conduct at issue and the
purported governmental interest the official sought to further would not
survive a constitutional balancing test.
58
E. Tenth Circuit decisions
From 1992 through 2000, the Tenth Circuit has taken a circuitous
route to define the requirements of qualified immunity. 59 From Medina to
51. Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 594.
52. Franz, 997 F.2d at 784.
53. Id. at 787-91.
54. As opposed to an individual's civil fights protected by 14 U.S.C. § 1983.
55. See e.g. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987) (holding that a court must determine the
"rational connection" between the infringement of a prisoner's constitutional rights and the existence
of a legitimate penological goal); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) (holding that
the infringement of a probationer's fights is not "unlimited" and is justified only by a showing of the
"special needs" of the probation system).
56. See Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1249 (10th Cir. 1992) (claiming that qualified
immunity will be abrogated if it was sufficiently clear that Defendants should have known the
[governmental] interest would not survive a balancing inquiry.); see also Prager v. LaFaver, 180
F.3d 1185, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing that the balance in favor of plaintiff should have
been anticipated by officials and thus their qualified immunity was abrogated); see also Medina, 960
F.2d at 1498 (stating that "[c]onduct may be so egregious that a reasonable person would know it to
be unconstitutional even though it is judged by a balancing test.").
57. See Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498.
58. See infra note 56.
59. The Tenth Circuit has gone full circle in defining the scope of sources applicable to the
determination of a "clearly established" right. See discussion infra pp. 13-29.
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Herring, consistency has eluded the Tenth Circuit in its attempt to
"clearly establish" what constitutes a "clearly established" right. Before
analyzinz Medina, however, it is first important to discuss Stewart v.
Donges, the unsuspecting root of the Tenth Circuit's chaotic qualified
immunity jurisprudence.
1. Stewart v. Donges
In Stewart, the plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a
police officer for allegedly violating his rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments during the defendant's arrest of the plaintiff for
larceny.6' The plaintiff, Stewart, accused the officer of making "material
misrepresentations and omissions" on the affidavit that supported a war-
rant for the plaintiff's arrest.62 In response, the defendant officer claimed
that he was entitled to qualified immunity from suit because it was not
"clearly established" at the time of the alleged conduct that making such
omissions would violate that plaintiffs rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.63
The Stewart court noted that the Supreme Court had previously found
that a police officer violates an individual's Fourth Amendment rights
when, in submitting an affidavit, knowingly makes a false statement or
makes a false statement in "reckless disregard of the truth."64 The Stew-
art court stated, however, that the Supreme Court failed to mention
whether this right extended to showings that a solice officer deliberately
or recklessly omitted material information. Despite the Supreme
Court's silence on the issue, the Stewart court looked to the rulings of the
other circuits in coming to the determination that the right did extend to
omissions, thereby holding that the right was "clearly established" at the
66time of the conduct at bar. In a side note, the court made the following
statement:
Our conclusion that the law was 'clearly established' does not neces-
sarily imply that it was frivolous for defendant to argue otherwise in
his interlocutory appeal. As long as there was no controlling Su-
preme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent at the time and it required an
extension of the holding in Franks to establish a duty of the defendant
not to withhold material information from the search warrant affida-
vit, we cannot necessarily say that an appeal arguing that the law was
60. 915 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1990).
61. Id. at 573.
62. Id.
63. ld. at 573,581.
64. Id. at 582 (referring to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 582-83.
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therefore not clearly established was 'frivolous," a 'sham,' or 'wholly
without merit.
67
In this statement, the Stewart court is simply noting situations where it
might be deemed "frivolous" for a defendant to claim that a law is not
"clearly established." If there is "controlling Supreme Court or Tenth
Circuit precedent at the time' 68 (emphasis added), then it might be
"frivolous" for a defendant to attempt to claim that the law is not "clearly
established." As discussed below, the court in Medina v. City and County
of Denver,69 extended this limited statement beyond its intended bounda-
ries b0 turning it into the determinative test of "clearly established"
rights.
2. Medina v. City and County of Denver
In Medina, the Tenth Circuit announced a rule that drastically al-
tered the way the court handled qualified immunity cases. 7' In Medina,
the plaintiff was hit while riding his bicycle by a stolen Cadillac engaged
72in a high-speed chase with the Denver Police Department. The district
court found that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
198373 because he could not produce enough evidence to show that the
Denver police "maintained a policy or course of conduct authorizing or
condoning reckless, high speed chases that was deliberately indifferent to
the rights of innocent bystanders. 74 The Tenth Circuit rejected the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the claim on these grounds and instead found
that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.75 In its review, the
Tenth Circuit court stated that the police officers were entitled to quali-
fied immunity because it was not "clearly established" at the time of the
accident that reckless behavior could trigger § 1983 liability, nor was it
apparent that police officers could be liable for injuries caused
indirectly.76
The Medina court held that in order for a right to be clearly estab-
lished, "there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on
point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts
67. Id. at 583 n.14.
68. Id.
69. 960 F.2d 1493 (10th Cir. 1992).
70. See id. at 1498 (stating that "[o]rdinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established,
there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight
of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.").
71. See Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498 (turning a single criterion from Stewart v. Donges for
determining whether a right is "clearly established" into the single determinative test).
72. Id. at 1494.
73. See infra note 21.





must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains., 77 In stating this
new proposition, the Medina court cited Stewart v. Donges,78 to justify
stepping into new qualified immunity territory. The court, however,
failed to explain how it made the leap from the holding in Stewart to its
unprecedented holding in Medina." Commentators believe that the
Medina court overstepped its bounds by turning Stewart's statement in-
tended to show when a defendant's claim is "frivolous" 80 into the af-
firmative "clearly established" requirement.81 One commentator wrote:
Citing Stewart for the proposition that a United States Supreme Court
or Tenth Circuit opinion is necessary, rather than sufficient, for clear
establishment is a classic example of fallacious converse logic in
Medina. Stewart states that such authority is a sufficient condition to
clearly establish a duty-not that it is a necessary condition. [citation
omitted] Moreover, Stewart discussed not what constituted clearly
established law, but what constituted a frivolous argument regarding
clearly established law.
82
Literally speaking, the Medina court placed a very strict limitation
on the qualified immunity analysis; a limitation which effectively stood
for the proposition that a law is not clearly established unless there is
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case, or the weight of authority of other
circuits on point. The Medina court merely paid lip service to the prior
standard, that the "alleged unlawfulness must be apparent in light of pre-
existing law ... [the] contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that
a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right., 83 Medina redefined the "reasonable official" aspect of the analysis
by drastically narrowing the scope of what a "reasonable official" is ex-
84pected to know. In a sweeping manner, Medina held that that if there is
no Supreme Court of Tenth Circuit case on point, a "reasonable official"
is not expected to possess knowledge of the contours of the right.85 There
are many scenarios where a government official knows that certain con-
77. Id. at 1498.
78. 915 F.2d at 582-83 (stating that "[o]ur conclusion that the law was 'clearly established'
does not necessarily imply that it was frivolous for the defendant to argue otherwise in his
interlocutory appeal. As long as there was not controlling Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent
at the time and it required an extension of the holding in Franks to establish a duty on behalf of the
defendant ... we cannot necessarily say that an appeal arguing that the law was therefore not clearly
established was 'frivolous."').
79. In relying on Stewart to support its holding, the Medina court takes Stewart totally out of
context and transforms a single factor in determining whether a law is "clearly established" into the
definitive test for the Tenth Circuit. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498.
80. Stewart, 915 F.2d at 583; see also discussion infra Part I.E. I.
81. Heather Meeker, Article: "Clearly Established" Law in Qualified Immunity Analysis for
Civil Rights Actions in the Tenth Circuit, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 79 (1995).
82. Id. at 113; see also Stewart, 915 F.2d at 583 (citation omitted).
83. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1497.
84. Id. at 1498.
85. Id.
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duct would violate another's constitutional rights where that particular
conduct has not been the subject of a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit
case. In the face of the new Medina standard, however, these scenarios
are kept out of the court's view.
3. Lawmaster v. Ward
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Lawmaster v. Ward86 is a prime
example of the court's disapproval of the narrow qualified immunity
requirements set forth in Medina. While many of the post-Medina quali-
fied immunity decisions mention Medina's main holding, they seem to
treat it not as the end-all-be-all requirement, but as one of the many fac-
tors of consideration.
87
In Lawmaster, the plaintiff sued several agents from the United
States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for their conduct during
a search of his home.88 After a confidential informant advised the agents
that the plaintiff owned an illegal automatic machine gun, the agents
submitted an affidavit and received a warrant to search the plaintiff's
home.89 The plaintiff alleged that the agents ransacked his home, and
conducted their search in an unreasonable manner in violation of his
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.90 Specifically, the plaintiff claimed
that he came home to find one of his pistols "submerged in the dog's
water bowl" and cigarette ashes "mixed in with the bedding which had
been stripped from the bed and left in a pile on the floor."9 1 The District
Court granted the agents qualified immunity from suit and consequently
92granted them summary judgment. The Lawmaster court reversed the
district court's decision to grant qualified immunity on the Fourth
Amendment claim of unreasonable conduct during the search of the
plaintiff's home.93 The court first discussed the rationale behind qualified
immunity:
86. 125 F.3d 1341
87. The post-Medina decisions seem to lend credence to the claim that Medina misconstrued
the holding in Stewart v. Donges by turning a single factor of consideration into the circuit's
determinative test. Lawmnaster emphasizes that a law may be "clearly established" even if neither
the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit had previously ruled on the particular action. See
Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 1350. Further, in Anava, the Tenth Circuit analyzes several sources besides
Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases in their determination of whether a right is "clearly
established." See Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys., Inc., 195 F.3d 584, 594-95 (10th Cir.
1999).
88. Lawnaster, 125 F.3d at 1344.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1345-46.
91. Id. at 1346.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1351.
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Qualified immunity serves the public by striking a balance between
compensating those who have been injured by official conduct and
protecting government's ability to perform its traditional functions.
Qualified immunity mitigates costs that society as a whole otherwise
bear such as the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy
from important public issues, and the deterrence of talented citizens
from accepting public office.
9 4
In defining a "clearly established" right, the Lawmaster court stated a
new and broader way to look at the "clearly established" requirement.
95
The new guideline did not necessarily broaden Medina's "Supreme
Court and Tenth Circuit" limitation, 96 but it did expand upon the range of
Supreme Court, Tenth Circuit and other circuit cases the Tenth Circuit
was willing to consider in its determination of whether the right was
"clearly established." 97 The court stated:
However, where the reasonableness inquiry necessarily turns on the
cases' particular facts such that the reasonableness determination
must be made on an ad hoc basis, we must allow some degree of gen-
erality in the contours of the constitutional right at issue. We would
be placing an impracticable burden on the plaintiff if we required
them to cite to a factually identical case before determining they
showed the law was 'clearly established' and cleared the qualified
immunity hurdle ... [w]hile qualified immunity was meant to protect
officials performing discretionary duties, it should not present an in-
surmountable obstacle to plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their consti-
tutional rights.
98
In line with this rationale, the Lawmaster court did not grant the
agents qualified immunity even though there were no decisions expressly
prohibiting the conduct at issue. 99 The court ruled that the general princi-
ples of the Fourth Amendment; the preservation of the sanctity of the
home and that while conducting searches, officers may only engage in
conduct that reasonably furthers the purpose of the search, were in fact
clearly established. 0 0 Unlike Medina, Lawmaster stood for the principal
that "[q]ualified immunity does not protect official conduct simply be-
cause the Supreme Court has never held the exact conduct at issue un-
94. id. at 1347.
95. Id. at 1351 (discussing that in order for a plaintiff to have any chance to overcome the
officer's qualified immunity defense, the right in question must be defined with "some degree of
generality," so that the plaintiff does not face an "insurmountable burden" proving the fight to be
"clearly established").
96. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498.
97. Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 1351.
98. Id. at 1351.
99. Id.
100. Id. Generally, the Fourth Amendment grants individuals the right to be "free from
unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 1347.
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lawful."'' Rather, the court retreated from Medina's narrow survey of
Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases in favor of a broader test of what
constitutes "clearly established."' 10 2 The court stated, "the test here is
whether the law is sufficiently well-defined such that a 'reasonable offi-
cial would understand that what he is doing violates that right."" 3
4. Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Systems, Inc.l°4
In 1999, the Tenth Circuit in Anaya reiterated the holding of
Medina, but did so with new emphasis on the second prong of Medina's
analysis. 0 5 The court held: "Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly
established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on
point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts"~~ • • ,106
must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains." The Anaya
court's analysis of the qualified immunity issue at bar clearly demon-
strated its rationale behind adding italics to the Medina test. 0 7 As op-
posed to Medina, the Anaya court sought to re-formulate the definition of
the "clearly established" right requirement to encompass rights beyond
the limits of the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit. First, the Anaya
court mentioned that the Tenth Circuit had, on prior occasion, ruled that
a right was "clearly established" where the Supreme Court and the Tenth
Circuit had never before ruled on the issue.'°9 Second, the court surveyed
the decisions of six circuit courts that had ruled on the issue."0 Third, the
court noted that the Colorado Supreme Court had specifically ruled on
the issue at hand."' Finally, the court thought it was also instructive to
look to the law of civil forfeitures in determining whether the right was
"clearly established" at the time of the conduct at issue."l 2 In coming to
101. Id. at 1350.
102. Id. at 1351.
103. Id. at 1351.
104. 195 F.3d 584 (10th Cir. 1999).
105. Id. at 594 (quoting Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498).
106. Id. (citing the exact holding of Medina. but adding italics to the entire second half of the
"clearly established" lam requirement).
107. After specifically adding emphasis to the second half of the Medina test, the Anaya court
found that the right to be free from civil seizures without probable cause "to believe that a person
was a danger to himself or others" was "clearly established" by the combination of other circuit
precedent, Colorado Supreme Court precedent, and the law of civil forfeitures. Id. at 594-95.
Looking at the Anaya court's analysis, it is clear that they intended to broaden the range of sources
from which a court may find a right to be "clearly established."
108. Id. at 594-95.
109. Id. at 594 (discussing the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Franz v. LVtle that Supreme Court or
Tenth Circuit precedent are not absolute preconditions to a finding that a right is "clearly
established).
110. Id.




the decision that the right at issue was "clearly established," the Anaya
court held:
In light of the clear authority that existed prior to 1995, and in light of
the laws of seizure the police officers should be expected to know, we
hold it was clearly established in 1995 that civil seizures without
probable cause to believe a person was a danger to himself or others
violated the Fourth Amendment. The defendants in their individual
capacities are not protected by qualified immunity.
113
The court's analysis clearly displays their intention to broaden the
scope of what a "reasonable official" must know in order to properly
claim the protection of qualified immunity. 14 In contrast, under a
Medina analysis, if a particular right was not specifically delineated by a
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case, whether or not a reasonable official
knew or should have known that his conduct violated a particular right
was immaterial.' 15 Despite Medina's assertion that "the clearly estab-
lished weight of authority from other courts"" 6 can be determinative of a
law's "clearly established" status, commentators disagree with the reality
of this contention.' 7 The clear intent of the Anaya court was to redefine
and broaden the scope of the Tenth Circuit's "clearly established" in-
quiry.1 18 By italicizing the second portion of the Medina requirement, 119
and by reasserting a broader sense of the "reasonable official" test,'20 the
Anaya court followed Lawmaster and continued to broaden what consti-
tutes a "reasonable official" in the Tenth Circuit's qualified immunity
jurisprudence.
5. Prager v. LaFaver 12
In 1999, the Tenth Circuit supported a somewhat different "clearly
established" standard for rights found under a constitutional balancing
test. 22 For example, if a plaintiff makes a claim that a government offi-cial violated his First Amendment right of free speech, a court will en-
113. Id. at 595 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 594-95.
115. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498.
116. Id.
117. See e.g. Meeker, supra note 24, at 116 (stating "[flinally, there is the law of other circuits.
The pivotal question is what type and what amount of extra-circuit authority, under the rubric of
Medina, comprise clearly established law. The answer to this question is at best complex and at
worst nonexistent. The Tenth Circuit has been quite inconsistent in its treatment of extra-judicial
authority to clearly establish rights.").
118. Anaya, 195 F.3d 594-95.
119. Id. at 594.
120. Id. at 594-95.
121. 180 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1999).
122. Id. at 1191-92.
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gage in a Pickering123 balancing test to determine whether his right was
abridged.124 Likewise, if a prisoner alleges that a government official
deprived him of his constitutional rights while incarcerated, the court
will engage in "rational connection" balancing test to determine whether
the deprivation was justified by a legitimate and neutral penological ob-
jective.125 Because rights that find their definition in constitutional bal-
ancing inquiries are, by their nature, more difficult to clearly foresee,
Prager recognized a need to allow more leeway to government officials
in this setting.126 The court stated, "[n]evertheless, 'to the extent that
courts in analogous (but not necessarily factually identical) cases have
struck the necessary balance, government officials will be deemed 'on
notice. '"1 27 The Tenth Circuit produced similar holdings in several other
cases throughout the 1990,s.128
II. HERRING V. KEENAN: BACK TO MEDINA AND BEYOND
In September 2000, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Herring v.
Keenan129 ignored the recent trend of Lawmaster and Anaya and reinvig-
orated the narrowness of Medina.'30 The decision arguably went a step
beyond Medina in its narrow approach to the "clearly established" right
inquiry and turned its back on the qualified immunity doctrine created by
the circuit since Medina.
131
123. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High School Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968)
(creating a balancing test for the determination of a public employee's First Amendment rights).
124. In Pickering, in determining whether the state had violated the teacher's First Amendment
right to free speech, the Court balanced the interests of the state as an employer promoting the
efficiency of "the public services that it performs through its employees" and the interests of the
teacher as a citizen commenting upon matters of public concern. See id. at 568.
125. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987) (holding that a court must determine the
"reasonable relation" between the infringement of a prisoner's constitutional ights and the existence
of a legitimate penological goal).
126. Prager, 180 F.3d at 1191 (stating the qualified immunity test, where there is a balancing
test involved, requires that a government official know where courts have "struck the necessary
balance" in cases that are factually analogous, but not requiring strict factual adherence).
127. Id. at 1191-92.
128. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498 (holding that "[c]onduct may be so egregious that a reasonable
person would know it to be unconstitutional even though it is judged by a balancing test."); see also
See Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that qualified immunity
will be abrogated if it was "sufficiently clear that Defendants should have known the [governmental]
interest would not survive a balancing inquiry.").
129. 218 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2000).
130. By defining the right in question with utter particularity, Herring ignored Lawmaster's
notion that rights need to be defined with a degree of generality. Id. at 1179. Furthermore, by
focusing only upon Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases, Herring disregarded Anaya's analysis
that included sources outside the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit. See id. at 1176.
131. See infra note 119.
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
A. Facts
In September of 1993, Mr. Herring began serving probation under
the supervision of probation officer Ms. Keenan following his conviction
for driving while intoxicated on federal property.'32 In December, in ac-
cordance with the terms of his probation, Herring met with Keenan.
During the meeting, Herring voluntarily told Keenan that he had been
tested for HIV and that he suspected that he would test positive., 31 It is
undisputed that Herring had not received the results of the test prior to
this meeting nor did he at any time after the meeting inform Keenan of
the final results of the test. 134 Additionally, Herring did not authorize
Keenan to disclose this information.
35
Without knowledge of the results of the test and without any authori-
zation to disclose any such information, Keenan immediately informed
Herring's employer, the manager of the 50's Caf6 at the Lowry Air Force
Base Recreation Center, that Herring was in fact HIV positive.136 (em-
phasis added) Further, Keenan advised the manager to fire Herring from
his position as a waiter. 137 Directly thereafter, Keenan telephoned Her-
ring's sister and informed her that her brother in fact tested positive for
HIV. 138 On January 10, 1994, Keenan informed the acting director of the
50's Caf6 that Herring was HIV positive.139 She further told the acting
director that Herring should be fired "because she believed that Colorado
law prohibited a person who has tested as HIV positive from working in
a food preparation position." 4° Herring's complaint, amongst other alle-
gations, charged that Keenan's unauthorized disclosure of his HIV status
was in direct violation of her own internal probation department guide-
lines.' 4' The Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures provides:
Officers should not disclose HIV infection or illness information to
the offender's family members, parents, or sexual/drug partners with-
out the offender's informed, written consent. If the offender will not
consent to disclosure and State law permits non-consensual disclosure
to public health officials, the officer should notify such officials ...
Officers should seek written, informed consent of the offender before
132. Id. at 1173.






139. Herring, 218 F.3dat 1173.
140. Id.
141. Id ("The complaint also alleges that: Defendants' conduct was in blatant violation of
Volume X, Sec. 16 D and F of the Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures which provides that
probation officers 'should not disclose HIV infection or illness information to the offender's family
members, parents, or sexual/drug partners without the offender's informed, written consent' and that
'notification of other third parties is the responsibility of the exposed person."').
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making further disclosure when information concerning a individual's
HIV antibody test ... is disclosed to the officer by a third party or by
the offender. 142
B. Disposition
Herring brought suit in the district court alleging that Keenan vio-
lated his federal constitutional right to privacy and his statutory right to
non-disclosure of a record pursuant to the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552(b), 143 by divulging to his employer and sister his alleged HIV posi-
tive status. 44 Herring died seven months after filing the initial
complaint. 4 5 Herring's sister took the role of her brother's personal rep-
resentative and subsequently filed a second amended complaint alleging
that Keenan's disclosures "violated Herring's constitutional right to pri-
vacy, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, and deprived Herring of his liberty without due process of
law in violation of the Fifth Amendment."' 146 Keenan filed a motion to
dismiss the second amended complaint alleging that she was entitled to
qualified immunity. 47 The District Court submitted Keenan's motion to
a magistrate judge for an opinion whether Keenan's conduct had violated
"clearly established" law. 148 The magistrate judge recommended that
Keenan's motion to dismiss be granted. 49 The magistrate judge based his
decision on the opinion that the "contours of the right of privacy" of a
probationer's HIV status were not "sufficiently clear" because "[n]o de-
cision of the United States Supreme Court or the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ha[d] specifically considered the parame-
ters of the constitutional right to privacy in the context of the limited
governmental disclosure of one's HIV status."1 50 Despite the magistrate
judge's recormnendation, the District Court rejected Keenan's motion to
dismiss. 5 1 The District Court ruled that Keenan's actions were clearly
not supported by a compelling governmental interest due to the fact that
her actions directly violated the written guidelines for probation
142. UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROBATION
ADMINISTRATION, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, vol. X, ch. IV, § 16, D, F
(requiring that probation officers receive written consent prior to any disclosure of a probationer's
HIV status).
143. Section 552(b)(6) disallows the disclosure of "personnel and medical files and similar
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,"
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000).
144. Herring, 218 F.3dat 1173.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1173-74.
147. Id. at 1174.
148. Id.
149. Id.




officers. 152 Moreover, relying on two prior Tenth Circuit opinions, the
District Court held that "the contours of the constitutional right to pri-
vacy as it relates to dissemination of one's actual or potential HIV status
,0153were clearly established in late 1993. The Tenth Circuit agreed with
the District Court that there is a constitutional right to privacy that pro-
tects an individual from the nonconsensual disclosure of information
pertaining to a person's health. 154 The court, however, reversed the Dis-
trict Court's denial of Keenan's qualified immunity claim. 155 The court
claimed that the right to privacy of a probationer regarding information
concerning his or her medical condition was not "clearly established" at
the time of Keenan's disclosure in 1993.156
The court started its inquiry by recognizing that the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that there exists a constitutional right to privacy re-
garding the non-disclosure of personal information.' The court also
cited Eastwood, the decision relied upon by the District Court in its de-
termination that the probationer's right to privacy in his HIV status was
"clearly established," for the more limited proposition that a constitu-
tional right to privacy in the non-disclosure of personal information ex-
ists. 58 After determining that a constitutional right to privacy exists,
159
the court then turned its attention to the "clearly established" requirement
of the qualified immunity claim. 160
The court proceeded to state that the "plaintiff need not demonstrate
that the specific conduct in this case had been previously held unlawful,
so long as the unlawfulness was 'apparent.,' 6' This statement, however,
152. Id.
153. Id. The District Court held that the Tenth Circuit had, prior to 1993. established that an
individual's constitutional right to privacy is "implicated when an individual is forced to disclose
information regarding personal sexual matters." Eastwood v. Dep't of Corrections of the State of
Oklahoma. 846 F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir. 1988). The District court further found that that Tenth
Circuit had recognized that employee medical records, which may contain intimate facts are entitled
to privacy protection. Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1994).
154. Herring, 218F.3dat 1175.
155. Id. at 1180-81.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1175 (citing the Supreme Court's decision in Whalen v. Roe. 429 U.S. 589 (1977),
as establishing two rights of privacy. First, an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and second, the interest in being independent when making certain kinds of
personal decisions).
158. Id. (limiting the holding in Eastwood to a general right to privacy in the non-disclosure of
personal information).
159. Id. (stating that "[tihis circuit, however, has repeatedly interpreted the Supreme Court's
decision in Whalen v. Roe as creating a'right to privacy in the non-disclosure of personal
information.").
160. Id. at 1175-76.
161. Id. at 1176.
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was not in accordance with the standard the court applied. 62 In the very
next sentence, the Herring court cited the holding in Anaya, without any
reference to the special emphasis the Anaya court placed on the "propo-
sition is supported by the weight of authority from other courts seg-
ment of the test. 164 In effect, the Herring court disregarded the intention
of the Anaya holding and reverted back to Medina. Furthermore, the
Herring court ignored its own statement in which they purported that
factual adherence to a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision was not a
necessary precondition to qualified immunity. 165 While stating that
"some but not precise factual correspondence" is required for a right to
be clearly established, the court went on to require strict factual adher-
ence. The court stated:
Thus, while Eastwood, Lankford, and Mangels indicate that under
some circumstances, a release of information regarding a person by a
government officer may violate a constitutionally protected right to
privacy, none of the cases discuss the question whether the right to
privacy protects a probationer who may be HIV positive from a lim-
ited disclosure by his or her probation officer to persons whom the
probation officer believed might be affected by their contact with the
probationer. The cases, therefore, did not clearly establish such a
right in 1993.166
In Anderson v. Creighton,'67 the Supreme Court required that the
right being questioned be defined with some degree of particularity so
that its' contours are clear enough that a "reasonable official would un-
derstand that what he is doing violates that right."'1 68 In Lawmaster v.
Ward,169 however, the Tenth Circuit limited necessary the degree of par-
ticularity. 170 The court in Lawmaster held:
However, where the reasonableness inquiry necessarily turns on the
cases' particular facts such that the reasonableness determination
must be made on an ad hoc basis, we must allow some degree of gen-
erality in the contours of the constitutional right at issue. We would
be placing an impracticable burden on plaintiffs if we required them
to cite to a factually identical case before determining they showed
the law was 'clearly established' and cleared the qualified immunity
162. See infra, note 157. The Anaya court mentioned that the specific conduct at issue need
not be previously deemed unlawful but proceeded to search amongst the Supreme Court and the
Tenth Circuit for cases factually identical to the case at bar.
163. Anava, 195 F.3d at 594.
164. Herring, 218 F.3d at 1176 (placing the second half of the qualified immunity in italics to
emphasize that the inquiry needs to extend beyond just the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit).
165. Id. at 1176.
166. Id. at 1178-9 (emphasis added).
167. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
168. Id. at 639.
169. 125 F.3d 1341 (10th Cir. 1997).
170. Id. at 1351.
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hurdle ... While qualified immunity was meant to protect officials
performing discretionary duties, it should not present an insurmount-
able obstacle to plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their constitutional
rights.1 7 '
If a plaintiff were required to show that the exact factual scenario
had previously been held unlawful to defeat the defendant's qualified
immunity defense, Harlow's balance 172 would be summarily defeated.
For example, Anderson required a plaintiff to state the right with more
particularity than "the defendant violated my 14 h Amendment Due Proc-
ess rights,"' 173 while Harlow and Lawmaster emphasize a plaintiff's need
to vindicate constitutional violations and a plaintiffs inability to do so if
rights are defined too narrowly. 174 In Herring, the Tenth Circuit required
precise factual correspondence between the right alleged to be violated
and a right that had previously been judicially vindicated. 75 In the proc-
ess, Herring violated its own precedent in Lawmaster176 and severely
disregarded Harlow's balancing strictures. 77 In essence, the court held
that because the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have not specifi-
cally ruled on this precise factual scenario, the right was not clearly es-
tablished. 178 Even though the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit, and the
weight of authority from other courts clearly indicated that a government
official's public release of personal information regarding a person may
violate a constitutionally protected right to privacy, the court failed to
classify the right as "clearly established" because the cases did not in-
clude the specific factual combination of probationer, probation officer,
and HIV positive status.'
79
III. TURNER V. SAFLEY 180 AND GRIFFIN V. WISCONSIN:' 8' THE RIGHT
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
The United States Supreme Court, in Turner v. Safley established
the rule that the charged government official must show that the in-
fringement of a prisoner's constitutional right is "reasonably related" to a
171. Id.
172. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1981) (holding that thc rationale behind the
qualified immunity doctrine is striking a balance between a citizen's interest in vindicating
violations of his or her constitutional rights and the government's interest in effective and efficient
governance).
173. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
174. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814; see also Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 1351.
175. Herring, 218 F.3d at 1178-79.
176. Lawmaster v. Ward. 125 F.3d 1341, 1350-51 (10th Cir. 1997).
177. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
178. See infra, note 157.
179. Id.
180. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
181. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
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legitimate governmental objective.18 2 In Turner, the Supreme Court
identified several factors applied in the balancing test to determine the
relatedness of the infringement and the government's objective. 8 3 The
factors in the penal system are:
(a) whether there is a 'valid, rational connection' between the regula-
tion and a legitimate government interest put forward to justify it; (b)
whether there are alternative means to exercising the asserted consti-
tutional rights that remain open to the inmates; (c) whether and the
extent to which accommodation of the asserted right will have an im-
pact on prison staff, inmates and the allocation of prison resources
generally; and (d) whether the regulation represents an 'exaggerated
response' to prison concerns.184
Before turning to the Supreme Court's treatment of the probation
system in Griffin v. Wisconsin,' 85 it is important to note the ramifications
of its cetermination of a prisoner's constitutional rights in Turner. In
Griffin, the Supreme Court stated that "probation is simply one point (or,
more accurately, one set of points) on a continuum of possible punish-
ments ranging from solitary confinement ... to mandatory community
service."' 86 While Griffin does not explicitly delineate a balancing test
for the deprivation of a probationer's constitutional rights akin to the test
set forth in Turner,' 7 it is only logical to assume that a probationer's
constitutional rights are less restricted than a prisoner's. If Turner holds
that a prisoner's constitutional rights cannot be infringed without a
showing that the infringement is "reasonably related" to a legitimate pe-
nological goal,' 88 it is safe to assume that an infringement of a proba-
tioner's constitutional rights must at least be justified by a showing that
the infringement "reasonably related" to a legitimate probationary goal.
On Griffin's continuum,' 9 probation is one step removed from prison,
thus it is logically necessary that a probationer's constitutional rights are
less restricted than a prisoner's. Supporting this rationale, in her dissent-
ing opinion in Herring, Judge Seymour took it as "clearly established"
that Griffin stands for the proposition that "probationers retain a right to
182. Turner, 482 U.S. at 78-9 (requiring that an infringement of a prisoner's constitutional
rights be "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.").
183. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91.
184. Id.
185. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
186. Id. at 874.
187. Id. ("We have recently held that prison regulations allegedly infringing constitutional
rights are themselves constitutional as long as they are 'reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.' We have no occasion in this case to decide whether, as a general matter, that test applies
to probation regulations as well.").
188. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91.
189. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874.
[Vol. 78:2
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
privacy under the Constitution which is violated where the State im-
pinges upon that right without a legitimate, governmental purpose.
' ' 90
Herring, nevertheless, failed to make a single mention of Turner's
"reasonable relation" requirement.' 9' Moreover, Herring failed to ana-
lyze the logical and necessary connection between Turner and Griffin-
if prisoners are protected by "X" (requiring that an infringement be "rea-
sonably related" to a legitimate penological goal 192) then probationers are
logically protected by "X+I" because probation is a less restrictive step
in the criminal justice process. While Griffin refrained from delineating
a standard of review for infringements in the probation system,' 93 it did
hold that restrictions must bear a relationship to the "special needs" of
the probation system. 194 It is only natural to assume that the Supreme
Court would determine the level of review in the probation system to at
least require a reasonable relation, if not more. Instead, Herring cited
Griffin as standing solely for the proposition that a probationer's right to
privacy is limited,195 and that Herring's expectation of privacy was justi-
fiably infringed by the probation officer.' 96 The court stated:
In view of the fact that it was clearly established in Griffin that a pro-
bationer's right to privacy is limited, without further guidance from
the Supreme Court or this circuit, a reasonable probation officer in
late 1993 could not be presumed to know whether a limited disclosure
of a probationer's HIV status to his sister and restaurant employer
would violate a probationer's constitutional rights.1
97
As noted by Chief Judge Seymour in her dissenting opinion, the
Herring majority completely misconstrued the Griffin holding.' 98 There
is no support for the Herring majority's claim that Griffin stands for the
bare holding that probationers have limited constitutional rights to pri-
vacy and that the Supreme Court gave no further guidance.199 Chief
Judge Seymour stated:
The majority here simply relies upon the court's approval of the
regulation in Griffin to conclude that Mr. Herring's privacy right was
not clearly established in this case. In so doing, the majority extrapo-
lates from the Court's naked holding without ever acknowledging the
underlying analysis and reasoning, and fails entirely to apply that
analysis and reasoning to the facts of this case. The majority thus ig-
190. Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000).
191. Turner, 482 U.S. at 78-9.
192. Id.
193. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874.
194. Id. at 873-74.
195. Herring, 218 F.3d at 1176.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1182.
199. Id. at 1176.
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nores the clear holding in Griffin that a probationer has a constitu-
tional right to privacy, which is limited insofar as the limitation is
justified by the 'special needs' of the probation system.
200
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit previously established a standard for
determining whether a right is "clearly established" when a constitutional
201balancing test is required. In three prior opinions, the Tenth Circuit
established that when a balancing test is at issue, if it is "sufficiently
clear" that the defendant should be aware that the governmental interest
would not survive a balancing inquiry, then the defendant is deemed to
202be on notice. In Medina, the Tenth Circuit held that "[c]onduct may be
so egregious that a reasonable person would know it to be unconstitu-
tional even though it is judged by a balancing test. 2 °3 Keenan's conduct
was unsupported and inimical to any recognizable governmental interest.
In fact, it ran contrary to U.S. probation system policy, Colorado state
criminal law, and was undertaken prior to her even securing knowledge
20that Herring in fact was HIV positive. ° Peculiarly, the Herring court
failed to analyze Keenan's conduct in light of an officer's reasonable
expectation of whether his or her conduct would survive a balancing test.
It seems rather clear that Keenan reasonably should have been aware of
her own internal probation system guidelines and would have known that
a direct violation of its stated guidelines would tip the balance out of her
favor.
The Herring decision ignored Tenth Circuit precedent by requiring
that there be strict factual analogy between the case at bar and a case
previously decided by either the Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit.
205
Further, the narrowness of the court's inquiry caused it to turn a blind
eye to the balancing tests established by both Turner and Griffin.20 6 As
200. Id.; see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding that prison guidelines
infringing prisoner's constitutional rights are lawful only when reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests); Doe v. Attorney Gen., 941 F.2d 780, 796 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that the law
was clearly established in 1988 that the government may disclose private information only upon a
showing that the disclosure of such information advances a legitimate governmental objective).
201. See discussion infra Part I.E.4.
202. Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that qualified
immunity will be abrogated if it was "sufficiently clear that Defendants should have known the
[governmental] interest would not survive a balancing inquiry."); see also Prager v. LaFaver, 180
F.3d 1185, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that a balance in favor of plaintiff should have been
anticipated by officials and thus their qualified immunity was abrogated); see also Medina, 960 F.2d
at 1498 ("Conduct may be so egregious that a reasonable person would know it to be
unconstitutional even though it is judged by a balancing test.").
203. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498.
204. Herring, 281 F.3d at 1182.
205. Id. at 1178-79.
206. Turner establishes that a prisoner's rights cannot be infringed absent a "reasonable
relation" to a legitimate penological goal. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Griffin does not speak to a
level of judicial scrutiny for the probation system, but does state that infringements must bear a
relationship to the "special needs" of the probation system. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74,
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noted by Chief Judge Seymour, Griffin clearly held that the "legitimacy
of the governmental interest" is the key ingredient to the "legitimate
government purpose" balancing test.207 The majority swept Turner and
Griffin under the rug and refused to recognize that Keenan's conduct was
actually contrary to a legitimate governmental interest. To highlight this
fact, the probation system maintained an internal policy of non-
disclosure of a probationer's HIV status.20 8 If the court had applied the
proper qualified immunity requirements and recognized that Turner and
Griffin both require a variation of a balancing test, it would be impossi-
ble for Keenan to attain qualified immunity. Conduct that not only failed
to state a legitimate governmental purpose but also explicitly violated the
policy of the governmental entity should fail a balancing inquiry per se.
Moreover, had Keenan followed its own precedent set in Anaya, 209 its
"clearly established" analysis would have included such sources as other
circuit authority, the probation system's internal guidelines (which Her-
ring was required to abide by), the Colorado state criminal statute which
she violated. If Keenan had been properly aware of the law "clearly es-
tablished" in 1993, she would have known that her conduct would fail
even the most deferential balancing test and constitute a violation of Her-
ring's constitutional right to privacy.
IV. THE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED RIGHT To PRIVACY PROTECTING
FROM DISCLOSURE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION FROM SUPREME COURT
AND CIRCUIT CASES
210In Whalen v. Roe , the Supreme Court dealt with a challenge to a
New York law seeking to create a database of names and addresses of
individuals on prescription drugs.2 1 The plaintiffs in the action claimed
that the compilation of personal medical information and the possibility
of its release to the public undermined their constitutional right to pri-
vacy. 212 The Whalen court stated that the Constitution supported a pri-
vacy interest grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of per-
sonal liberty. 2 From this foundation, the court outlined two distinct pri-
vacy interests; an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters, and an individual's interest in independently making personal
207. Herring, 218 F.3d at 1182.
208. Id. The internal policy statement mandates that "[o]fficers should not disclose HIV
infection or illness information without the offender's informed written consent." See id. at 1182.
209. In Anaya, the Tenth Circuit broadened its definition of the scope of the sources from
which "clearly established" law may arise. For example, the Anaya court looked to other circuit
cases, cases decided by the Colorado Supreme Court, and the civil forfeitures laws in determining
the applicable "authority" in determining whether a right in actually "clearly established." Anaya v.
Crossroads Managed Care Sys. Inc., 195 F.3d 584, 594-95 (10th Cir. 1999).
210. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
211. Id. at 591.
212. Id. at 599-600
213. Id. at 600.
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214decisions. The Tenth Circuit has repeatedly interpreted the Supreme
Court's decision in Whalen as effectively "creating a right to privacy in
the non-disclosure of personal information. 2'5 The following cases show
that both the Tenth Circuit and several other circuits have interpreted
Whalen's two privacy interests to include an individual's right to privacy
in the non-disclosure of one's sexual and medical information.
216
A. Eastwood v. Department of Corrections of the State of Okla-
homa2 1-Whalen Interpreted in the Tenth Circuit
In Eastwood, the plaintiff, a former employee of the Oklahoma De-
partment of Corrections brought a § 1983 suit against a departmental
investigator for violating her constitutional right to privacy.21 After be-
ing sexually assaulted by a fellow employee, the Department of Correc-
tions assigned an investigator to question her version of the incident.219
The plaintiff alleges that this investigator, Mr. Lovelace, harassed her
with explicit questions regarding her sexual history which he subse-
quently shared with others at the Department of Corrections. 220 As a re-
sult, the plaintiff alleges that the Department of Corrections became an
"offensive work environment" where she was continually harassed with
further sexually explicit questions and "offensive and insulting drawings
within the DOC facility. 221
In response to the defendant's claim of qualified immunity, the
Eastwood court first stated that in determining whether a law is "clearly
established," they do not require there to be "strict factual correspon-
dence between the cases establishing the law and the case at hand. 222
Even further, the court held that it is "incumbent upon government offi-
cials 'to relate established law to analogous factual settings.
' ' 23
Regarding the constitutional right to privacy question, the Eastwood
court noted that the Supreme Court had established two distinct privacy
214. ' Id. at 599-600.
215. Herring, 218 F.3d at 1175; see also Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986)
(recognizing a constitutional privacy interest that is especially significant where the information is
"intimate or otherwise personal in nature"); Eastwood v. Dep't of Corrections of Okla., 846 F.2d
627, 630-31 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that an individual has a right to privacy that protects him or
her from forced disclosure of his or her sexual history); Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477
(10th Cir. 1994) (holding that the right to privacy in one's medical information was established in
1990).
216. See discussion infra Part IV.A-D.
217. 846 F.2d 627 (1Oth Cir. 1988).
218. Id. at 628-29.
219. Id. at 629.
220. Id.
221. Id.




interests in Whalen v. Roe.2 24 The Eastwood court interpreted Whalen to
encompass the privacy interest implicated in this case.225 The court held:
"[t]his constitutionally protected right is implicated when an individual is
forced to disclose information regarding personal sexual matters. ,226
B. Lankford v. City of Hobart227 -Right to Privacy of Medical Records
in the Tenth Circuit
In Lankford, the plaintiff alleged that after rebuking her employer's
sexual advances, he "used his authority as chief of police to obtain [her]
private medical records without her consent from a local hospital in an
attempt to discredit her and to prove his statements that she was a les-
bian." In holding that the defendant was not entitled to qualified im-
munity because the privacy violations of this sort were "clearly estab-
lished in 1990,, ' 229 the court stated, "there is 'no question that an em-
ployee's medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal
nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protec-
tion.'"
23 0
C. Harris v. Thigpen: 231 Eleventh Circuit Applies the Turner Factors
In Harris v. Thigpen, the Eleventh Circuit discussed a prisoner's
specific right regarding the non-disclosure of his or her HIV positive
232status. In Harris, the appellant challenged the Alabama Department of
Corrections' policies of mandatory HIV testing and segregation of pris-
oners testing HIV positive as a violation of those prisoners' constitu-
tional right to privacy.233 First, the court explained that as a general prin-
ciple, "convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by
reason of their conviction and confinement in prison. 234 The court cited
224. 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977); see also discussion infra Part IV.
225. Eastwood, 846 F.2d at 631.
226. Id.
227. 27 F.3d 477 (10th Cir. 1994).
228. Id. at 478.
229. Id.
230. ld.; see also Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (holding that
"[c]asual, unjustified dissemination of confidential medical information to non-medical staff and
other prisoners can scarcely be said to belong to the sphere of defendants' discretionary functions.
Therefore, the defense of qualified immunity is not available to defendants); U.S. v. Westinghouse,
638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (interpreting Whalen's dual privacy ights to include an
individual's right to privacy in medical records and medical information).: Mangels v. Pena, 789
F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986) (recognizing a constitutional privacy interest that is especially
significant where the information is "intimate or otherwise personal in nature").
231. 941 F.2d 1495 (lth Cir. 1991).
232. Id. at 1498.
233. Id. at 1512.
234. Id.; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (holding that -convicted prisoners
do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison").
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Turner v. Safley235 when it stated, "[p]rison walls do not separate inmates
from their constitutional rights.,,236 Thus, prior to their determination of
whether the prisoner's constitutional rights to privacy regarding the non-
disclosure of his HIV positive status was violated, the Eleventh Circuit
237affirmatively proclaimed that prisoners maintain constitutional protec-
238tion despite their position within the penological system.
The Harris court went on to state the limitations upon the constitu-
tional rights of prisoners. 239 "It is also axiomatic, however, that 'lawful
incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of
many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the consideration
underlying our penal system., 240 The court added that prisoners retain the
constitutional rights that do not run contrary to the "legitimate penologi-
cal objectives of the corrective system. 241
Upon this foundation, the Harris court used the "rational connec-
tion" factors set forth in Turner2 4 2 and found that the Alabama Depart-
ment of Corrections' policies did not violate the prisoners' constitutional
right to privacy in light of the countervailing interests of the penological
243system. The court recognized the legitimacy of the penological sys-
244tem's interest in reducing HIV transmission and violence .
More importantly, however, the Harris court recognized and fol-
lowed two "clearly established" trends that the Tenth Circuit ignored in
Herring. First, Harris acknowledged a prisoner's residual constitutional
rights, and followed Turner by balancing those residual rights with the
235. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
236. Harris, 941 F.2d at 1512; see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,84(1987).
237. The Supreme Court in Griffin v. Wisconsin also held that probationers maintain
constitutional protections despite their involvement with the probation system. See infra pp. 16-17;
see also Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000) (discussing in dissent, Judge
Seymore claimed, "Griffin, therefore, clearly established six years prior to the incidents here that
probationers retain a right to privacy under the Constitution which is violated where the State
impinges upon that right without a legitimate, governmental purpose.").
238. Harris, 941 F.2d at 1515-16; see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)
(holding that "[t]he constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the requirement
that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek
redress for violations of their constitutional rights."); Thornbaugh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)
(reiterating Turner's holding that "[pirison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates
from the protections of the Constitution."); Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420, 1423 (11 th Cir. 1987)
(holding that "[a] prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned
for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.").
239. Id. at 1512-13
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See infra p. 15.
243. Harris, 941 F.2d at 1521.
244. ld. at 1517.
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legitimate objectives of the penological system 45 To the contrary, Her-
ring misconstrued the holding in Griffin and failed to recognize the need
to justify an infringement of a probationer's constitutional rights by the
special needs" of the probation system. 46 Second, the Harris court was
careful to point out the existence of a constitutional right to privacy and
the "significant privacy interest" triggered by the disclosure of a pris-
oner's HIV status.247 As previously discussed, because the probation
system is situated on a less restrictive point on the criminal justice con-
tinuum than the penological system, it naturally follows that proba-
248tioner's maintain a greater constitutional rights than prisoners .
D. United States v. Westinghouse:24 9 The Right to Privacy in Medical
Information
In United States v. Westinghouse, the Third Circuit interpreted the
dual privacy rights created by the Supreme Court in Whalen; an individ-
ual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and an individ-
ual's interest in independently making personal decisions, 25 to encom-
pass an individual's right to privacy in medical records and medical in-
formation. 251 The Westinghouse court stated:
There can be no question that an employee's medical records, which
may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the
ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection. Information about
one's body and state of health is a matter which the individual is or-
dinarily entitled to retain within the 'private enclave where he may
lead a private life.' 
252
In Westinghouse, the Third Circuit stated that governmental intru-
sion into medical records is allowed only after the government can show
that the public interest in disclosure outweighs the individual's privacy
245. Id. at 1515 ("The [Turner] Court determined that the standard of review for evaluating
prisoners' constitutional claims should be one of reasonableness: when a prison regulation or policy
'impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests."').
246. Griffin holds that a probationer maintains residual constitutional rights that are less than
what is afforded to an average citizen but nevertheless cannot be stripped without being justified by
the "special needs" of the probation system.
247. Id. at 1514 ("The threat to family life and the 'emotional enrichment [gained] from close
ties with others' ... is quite real when an AIDS victim's diagnosis is revealed. Ignorance and
prejudice concerning the disease are widespread; the decision of whether, or how, or when to risk
familial and communal opprobrium and even ostracism is one of fundamental importance.").
248. See infra Part III.
249. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
250. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
251. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 57 1.
252. Id.
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.253 cgvrmnainrsointerest. In determining whether the specific governmental intrusionwas constitutional, the court listed the factors relevant to the inquiry:
the type of record requested, the information it does or might contain,
the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure,
the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was
generated, the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclo-
sures, the degree and need of access, and whether there is an express
statutory mandate,. articulated public policy, or other recognizable
public interest militating toward access. 
54
The first four Westinghouse factors question the nature of the in-
formation requested and the potential injury caused by the nonconsensual
disclosure of that information.255 The purpose for these factors is to de-
termine which medical information disclosures are more harmful than
others. These factors serve the purpose of drawing a line between non-
consensual disclosure of a trivial matter, such as an employee's allergic
tendencies, and disclosure of information that has the ability to harm the
employee.
In terms of potential injury and discrimination against the employee,
an individual's HIV status is arguably the most sensitive form of medical
information.256 Several federal courts, prior to 1993, commented on the
heightened risk of disclosure of HIV information.257 The Ninth Circuit
held that a forced and mandatory AIDS test might violate an inmate's
258 259constitutional rights. In Doe v. Borrough of Barrington,  the federaldistrict court of New Jersey stated:
The sensitive nature of medical information about AIDS makes a
compelling argument for keeping this information confidential. Soci-
ety's moral judgments about the high-risk activities associated with
the disease, including sexual relations and drug use, make the infor-
mation of the most personal kind. Also, the privacy interest in one's
exposure to the AIDS virus is even greater than one's privacy interest
in ordinary medical records because the stigma that attaches with the
253. Id. at 577.
254. Id. at 578.
255. Id.
256. See infra note 229.
257. See e.g., Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp 376, 384 (D.N.J. 1990) (stating that
an individual's privacy interest in HIV information outweighs that of regular medical information
because of the stigma that attaches to the HIV virus); Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D.N.Y.
1988) (noting that disclosure of HIV information threatens family life and triggers prejudice and
ignorance).
258. Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that "[prison] authorities cannot
rely on general or conclusory assertions to support their policies. Rather, they must first identify the
specific penological interests involved and then demonstrate both that those specific interests are the
actual bases for their policies and that the policies are reasonably related to the furtherance of the
identified interests.").
259. 729 F. Supp. 376, 384 (D.N.J. 1990)
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disease. The potential for harm in the event of a nonconsensual dis-
closure is substantial.
260
Further, in Doe v. Coughlin,26' the federal district court for the Northern
District of New York stated:
Each [seropositive prisoner] is fully aware that he is infected with a
disease which at the present time has inevitably proven fatal. In the
court's view there are few matters of a more personal nature, and
there are few decisions over which a person could have a greater de-
sire to exercise control, than the manner in which he reveals that di-
agnosis to others ... [t]he threat to family life and the 'emotional en-
richment [gained] from close ties to others' ... is quite real when an
AIDS victim's diagnosis is revealed. Ignorance and prejudice con-
cerning the disease are widespread; the decision of whether, or how,
or when to risk familial and communal opprobrium and even ostra-
cism is one of fundamental importance.
262
E. Herring's Two Flaws
It was clearly established in 1993 that a government official could
not impinge upon the constitutional rights of a probationer without the
263justification of a legitimate governmental purpose. Moreover, it was
also clearly established in 1993 that courts only allow government in-
fringement of an individual's medical information where there is a find-
ing "that the societal interest in disclosure outweighs the privacy interest
on the specific facts of the case. ' '264 Thus, the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Herring is flawed in two key respects. First, to grant the defendant quali-
fied immunity, the Tenth Circuit applied a narrow construction of
"clearly established" rights-a construction that was antithetical to Tenth
Circuit precedent since Medina.265
Second, because of the consequent narrow qualified immunity analy-
sis, the Tenth Circuit effectively removed from consideration Supreme
Court and circuit authorities that sufficiently establish that (a) a proba-
tioner's constitutional rights cannot be impinged unless "justified by the
'special needs' of the probation system,26 and (b) there exists a privacy
260. Id.
261. 697 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
262. Id. at 1237-38.
263. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
264. U.S. v. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980).
265. In Lawinaster, the circuit held that the right in question needs to be defined with some
degree of generality in order to give plaintiffs the ability to rebut a defendant's qualified immunity
defense. Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1351 (10th Cir. 1997) Further, in Anaya, the circuit
expanded the range of sources it was willing to consider in determining whether a law was "clearly
established" at the time of the conduct in question. Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys., Inc.,
195 F.3d 584, 594-95 (10th Cir. 1999).
266. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987); see also Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d
1171, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000) (Seymour, J. dissenting).
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interest in one's medical records and medical information, especially so
when the information pertains to one's HIV status.
267
More specifically, the Tenth Circuit ignored the Supreme Court's
decisions in Turner and Griffin, which both stand for the proposition that
prisoners and probationers retain their constitutional rights desvite their
status within either the penological or probationary system. Turner
established a "rational connection" balancing test that forces the gov-
ernment to justify any impingement upon the constitutional rights of
prisoners by proving that the restriction is "rationally connected" to a
penological or objective. 269 Likewise, Griffin affirmatively holds that a
probationer has a constitutional right to privacy that can be impinged
only upon a showing of a "special need of the probation system. ,70 The
Herring court failed to even mention the existence of either constitu-
tional balancing test.
Second, the Herring court made no mention of the Third Circuit's
decision in Westinghouse,271 which recognized a constitutional right to
privacy regarding one's medical records and medical information, or the
Eleventh Circuit's determination in Harris v. Thigpen, which emphasized
the "significant privacy interest" triggered by an individual's HIV
status. 2  Westinghouse outlined a seven-factor balancing test to help
determine the types of medical records and information that require pro-
273tection from divulgence without consent. As stated above, the Herring
court's narrow qualified immunity standard caused it to sweep these
other circuit decisions under the rug.
IV. ANALYSIS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF MEDINA WITH TEETH
Like the flaws, the implications of the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Herring v. Keenan274 are two-fold. First, the decision may cause negative
social ramifications due to its treatment of the constitutional right to pri-
vacy regarding a person's HIV positive status. The decision, to the con-
267. The Third Circuit, in U.S. v. Westinghouse interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in
Whalen to encompass an individual's right to privacy in medical record and medical information, see
Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 571. Moreover, in Harris v. Thigpen, the Eleventh Circuit stated that one
HIV status triggers a "significant privacy interest" that is "of fundamental importance," see Harris v.
Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1514 (11th Cir. 1991).
268. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
269. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84.
270. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875.
271. Id. at 570.
272. Harris, 941 F.2d at 1514.
273. Hence, if these medical records/information are such that require protection, a person's
divulgence of the records/information without the patient's consent would be deemed a
constitutional violation. See generally id. at 578-579 (applying the seven-factor test to the conduct
at bar with the underlying inference that if the balance tips in favor of protection, the non-consensual
divulgence of the records/information would be a constitutional violation).
274. 218 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2000).
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trary, does not stand for the proposition that a constitutional right to pri-
vacy in an individual's HIV status has not been judicially recognized.
Rather, it purports that the right was not "clearly established" circa
1993.275
In coming to the decision that the right to privacy in a probationer's
HIV status was not "clearly established" in 1993, the Herring court went
directly against Tenth Circuit qualified immunity analysis precedent. In
Lawmaster and again in Anaya, the Tenth Circuit consistently broadened
the scope of sources they were willing to consider in the determination
whether a right was "clearly established" for qualified immunity pur-
276poses. Moreover, in Lawmaster, the Tenth Circuit also recognized the
need to define the right in question with a lesser degree of particularity to
facilitate a plaintiff's attempt to defeat a government official's qualified
immunity defense.277 The Herring court had a choice. It could follow
precedent and define the right with a lesser degree of particularity so that
the precise factual scenario would not have to have been previously ruled
upon. Or it could do what it did and turn the precedent on its head and
define the right narrowly, requiring that the precise factual scenario be
specifically ruled upon in either the Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit.
Even though the Herring court refrains from elucidating any policy
based views or rationale regarding an individual's right to privacy in his
or her HIV status, its decision to defy precedent speaks volumes. In the
final analysis, the public policy message sent by the Tenth Circuit is
clear-action certainly speaks louder than words. The Herring court
changed its qualified immunity analysis in order to protect a government
official who, in direct violation of internal policy, informed an HIV
positive probationer's employer and family of his HIV status. In chang-
ing the analysis, the Herring court looked at the case through a micro-
scope and eliminated from view numerous sources that would have
served as the "clearly established" authority that a "reasonable official"
would be expected to know about. Despite the fact that in 1994 the Tenth
Circuit recognized that there is a constitutional right to privacy regarding
disclosure by a peace officer of an arrestee's HIV test results,278 Herring
275. Id. at 1176. Herring states that an individual's fight to privacy in his or her HIV
information was established in 1994.
276. In Lawmaster, the Tenth Circuit held that "the shield of qualified immunity is pierced if in
light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness of the conduct is apparent to the officer." Lawmaster v.
Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1350 (10th Cir. 1997). In Anaya, the Tenth Circuit broadened its definition of
the scope of the sources from which "clearly established" law may arise. For example, the Anaya
court looked to other circuit cases, cases decided by the Colorado Supreme Court, and the civil
forfeitures laws in determining the applicable "authority" in determining whether a right in actually
"clearly established." See Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys. Inc., 195 F.3d 584, 594-95 (10th
Cir. 1999).
277. Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 1351.
278. A.L.A. v. West Valley City, 26 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 1994) (establishing in the Tenth
Circuit in 1994, that an arrestee has a constitutional right to privacy in the nondisclosure of his HIV
information).
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strikes a blow to the public's confidence that the court stands behind the
policy that underlies its 1994 decision.
Besides Herring's public policy implications, this analysis seeks to
discuss the long-term effects of the court's narrow qualified immunity
analysis and its potential to halt the creation of new civil or constitutional
rights in the Tenth Circuit. In Herring, the Tenth Circuit unleashed a new
breed of qualified immunity analysis: Medina with sharper teeth. Not
only did the court require that a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision
exist that was 'n point,279 but, contrary to Tenth Circuit precedent, 280 it
also required a strict factual similarity between the case at bar and a pre-
viously decided case. 281 Looking for precedent under a microscope, the
court granted the defendant qualified immunity because it was unable to
find a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case that specifically held that a
probationer has a constitutional right to privacy regarding the limited
disclosure of his or her HIV positive status by his or her probationer to
282family members and employers.
The decision in Herring, however, took the qualified immunity
analysis in the Tenth Circuit to a level unimaginable even by Medina
standards. Under a strict Medina analysis, the Tenth Circuit would likely
take notice of the Supreme Court precedent in Turner and Griffin and at
least acknowledge the need to conduct a "rational connection" balancing
test to determine whether the impingement was justified by a legitimate
goal of the probation system. Even under Medina, the Tenth Circuit
would recognize that in 1993, it was entirely inimical to a prisoner's or a
probationer's constitutional right to privacy to sanction an alleged right
to privacy violation without conducting the proper balancing test.
Additionally, Herring's strict factual setting requirement turned
Medina on its head. The gravity of the court's new standard is evident by
the fact that the nonconsensual disclosure of a probationer's HIV status
stood in direct violation of a probation system rule requiring consent
prior to any such disclosure.283 "In making the disclosures to Mr. Her-
ring's family and employer, Ms. Keenan acted contrary to every written
guideline addressing the disclosure of confidential medical information
contained in the U.S. Probation Manual, which serves as the 'authorita-
279. While the majority initially states that a right is clearly established when there is a
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit opinion on point, or that the plaintiffs proposition is supported by
the weight of authority from other courts, the decision later only mentions the need for the first two
and drops the latter from consideration. See Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir.
2000).
280. See discussion infra Part I, I.A.2, I.A.3, I.A.4.
281. Herring, 218 F.3d at 1179 (stating that "[nione of the cases identified by the plaintiff
involved a limited disclosure by a probation officer to a probationer's sister and restaurant employer
of voluntarily exposed information... .
282. Id.
283. Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2000).
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tive standard for community supervision of federal offenders." 284 (em-
phasis added) In her dissenting opinion in Herring, Judge Seymour dis-
cussed the Supreme Court's decision in Griffin that upheld as proper a
search conducted within the residence of a probationer.28 Judge
Seymour concluded that Griffin held that the search was "reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted
pursuant to a valid regulation governing probationers, which was itself
,,216justified by the special needs of the probation system... Judge
Seymour made the point that under a properly construed Griffin analysis,
there is no way Keenan would have been granted qualified immunity.
Judge Seymour stated:
[H]ere, however, we are asked to review the independent action of a
probation officer which was directly contrary to the published guide-
lines of the U.S. Probation Office. Ms. Keenan cannot plausibly ar-
gue that her random, unauthorized and illegal conduct provides a ba-
sis for a legitimate or reasonable governmental interest sufficient to
warrant the intrusion on Mr. Herring's privacy which occurred
here."
,287
Griffin required that the restriction be justified by a special need of the
probation system. Likewise, Turner required that a "'valid, rational con-
nection' between the regulation and a legitimate government interest put
forward to justify it"'288 must exist.
The Herring court's narrow analysis caused it to miss the seven-part
balancing test set forth in Westinghouse289 as well. Westinghouse's first
four factors are dedicated to determining the nature of the medical in-
formation and the potential injury to an individual if that information is
290disclosed. Undoubtedly, one's HIV positive information is the most
sensitive type of medical information and its disclosure without consent
poses a potential harm that can devastate the life and emotional well be-
ing of the individual.
The Herring court's decision to grant the probation officer qualified
immunity leads one to question the modem court's stance on the rights of
those afflicted with the HIV virus. While the social ramifications of this
decision on the rights of HIV victims is muted by the court's decision
291one year after the conduct at issue in Herring, it is peculiar that the
court would turn its recent qualified immunity doctrine on its head to
284. Herring, 218 F.3d at 1182 (J. Seymour, dissenting).
285. Id. at 1183-84.
286. Id.
287. Herring, 218 F.3d at 1184 (J. Seymour, dissenting).
288. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987).
289. U.S. v. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980).
290. Id.
291. A.L.A. v. West Valley City, 26 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that an individual
holds a constitutional right to privacy regarding his or her HIV status).
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protect a probation officer who clearly and blatantly violated the consti-
tutional privacy rights of her probationer.
CONCLUSION: THE MISSING VOICE
After Herring, the possibility of the Tenth Circuit independently
recognizing the existence of a new constitutional right may be nonexist-
ent. Under its Herring qualified immunity standard, the Tenth Circuit has
effectively decided to relinquish all circuit authority to establish new
laws in response to novel social problems. One commentator feared that
Medina had developed a narrow qualified immunity analysis that effec-
tively removed the Tenth Circuit's ability to create new civil and consti-
tutional rights. The commentator wrote:
In conclusion, Medina changed the Tenth Circuit's handling of the
qualified immunity issue. Those cases that actually cite the Medina
rule uniformly hold there is no clearly established duty. Most of the
clearly established rights from cases prior to Medina would probably
not survive a post-Medina analysis ... [w]hen there is clearly estab-
lished weight of authority in other circuits, the Tenth Circuit will
follow suit. This not only cedes Tenth Circuit decision-making to
other circuits, but, in a sense, undermines the independence of the
circuit courts. This is particularly problematic because one of the
strongest predicates for United States Supreme Court review is the
resolution of circuit splits. Therefore, the Medina rule tends to belay
Supreme Court review ... [t]herefore, it is likely' the Medina rule...
will slow the development of civil rights law...
Similarly, requiring that the conduct and facts be strictly analogous
to conduct and facts previously deemed unlawful by the Supreme Court
or another Tenth Circuit decision really means that no fight or law will
ever be clearly established in the Tenth Circuit unless such a right or law
was previously established by the Supreme Court. One of the functions
of the circuit courts is to decide novel issues with the potential for circuit
disagreement. Likewise, one of the functions of the Supreme Court is to
survey the areas of circuit disagreement and grant certiorari to settle the
disputed questions of law. As a result of Herring, however, the Tenth
Circuit has effectively taken itself out of the mix. If the Tenth Circuit
chooses to follow Herring in future qualified immunity cases, not only
will the potential for legal development in this area of law be dormant,
but the overall legal discourse between the circuits and the Supreme
Court over pressing legal and social matters will be impaired by the
Tenth Circuit's missing voice. On the flip side, if the Tenth Circuit
chooses to revert back to its broader pre-Herring qualified immunity
analysis, its decision to look at Herring the way that it did begs the ques-
292 Meeker, supra note 24, at 133.
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tion of their tenuous stance regarding the right to privacy in an individ-
ual's HIV status.
Colin Barnacle

